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ABSTRACT 
MEASURING CENTRAL BANK CREDIBILITY FROM THE EFFECT OF 
INFLATION SHOCKS ON ASSET PRICES 
JUNMEI XU 
 2017  
 In the early 1990s, the Bank of Canada explicitly adopted the inflation-targeting 
framework for monetary policy, while the Federal Reserve did not; instead, the Fed 
settled on an implicit inflation-targeting framework. In this study, I test whether the Bank 
of Canada and the Federal Reserve earned credibility for their respective commitments—
explicit or otherwise—to maintain low and stable inflation. I model how credibility 
shapes the responses of asset prices to inflation shocks.  And, for each country, I estimate 
responses of commodity and foreign exchange prices to announcements of inflation 
shocks during the periods of 1982 to 1991 (pre-inflation targeting period) and 1996 to 
2005 (inflation-targeting period).  I conclude that for Canada in the period 1996 to 2005, 
but not before, the Bank of Canada’s commitment to maintain low and stable inflation 
was credible.  For the US, the credibility of the Federal Reserve seems to have grown as 
well, though to a lesser extent relative to the Bank of Canada.  Taken together, my results 
indicate that the Bank of Canada in the period1996 to 2005 is most credible, both relative 
to its own past and to the Federal Reserve. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Over the past two decades (1990-2010), inflation targeting as a framework for 
monetary policy has been widely adopted by central banks.  The framework plays an 
increasingly important role in the development of monetary policy throughout the world. 
In an inflation-targeting framework, a central bank announces official numerical targets 
or target ranges for the inflation rate over one or more time horizons and specifies that 
achieving a low and stable inflation rate is the primary long-run goal of monetary policy. 
By establishing numerical objectives to be met over a specified period, the inflation-
targeting framework holds central bankers accountable and, thus, encourages frequent 
communication between inflation-targeting central banks and the public. Additionally, 
frequent communication increases the transparency of monetary policy. The explicit 
numerical objectives and the transparency of inflation targeting policy together make 
monitoring inflation targeting easier for the public and help the inflation targeting central 
banks build credibility. 
In this study, I test and compare central bank credibility for low and stable 
inflation of two central banks—namely, the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve 
System over the period of 1980 to 2005. In the early 1990s, the Bank of Canada publicly 
transitioned adopted in inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy; meanwhile, 
the Federal Reserve did not. This change at the Bank of Canada relative to itself and the 
Federal Reserve allows me to evaluate the effects of different monetary policies on 
central bank credibility for low and stable inflation.  
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Central bank credibility has become a focal point in the contemporary literature 
on monetary policy, where credibility is commonly defined as the ability of the central 
bank to manage inflation expectations of economic agents. Specifically, if a central bank 
were to achieve credibility, economic agents would be less likely to adjust their 
expectations of inflation upward in response to a one-off inflation shock.  Put differently, 
inflation expectations would be anchored. In contrast, if a central bank were not to 
achieve credibility, economic agents would instead interpret an inflation shock as a new, 
looser monetary policy.  In this case, economic agents would raise their expectations of 
inflation and thereby bring about a higher inflation rate. For example, during the 1970s, 
the Federal Reserve increased the federal funds rate in order to reduce inflation. 
However, because it did not have credibility for maintaining low and stable inflation at 
that time, the federal funds rate increases in fact led to higher inflation expectations, 
because market participants deduced that an expansionary monetary policy was likely to 
occur in the near future and the Federal Reserve would not maintain its inflation target. 
(C. D. Romer & Romer, 2000) 
In general, the greater central bank credibility is, the more convinced economic 
agents are that the announced inflation target will be met and, thus, the more firmly 
anchored inflation expectations are. When a central bank adopts an inflation-targeting 
framework for monetary policy, it does so, in part, to build credibility.  If a central bank 
is credible, aggregate shocks exert their impact transitorily, and thus the central bank 
anchors inflation expectations and achieves its inflation target. This is why increasing 
central bank credibility is one of the objectives of inflation targeting policy.  
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In the literature there are several studies that use the dynamics of long-term 
inflation expectations to infer something about central bank credibility. In some of these 
studies, researchers use survey data to measure inflation expectations directly; in others, 
researchers use financial market data to infer the dynamics of inflation expectations 
indirectly.  In this study, I examine commodity-market data.  Specifically, I measure the 
responses of commodity prices to inflation shocks in order to identify whether inflation 
expectations are relatively well anchored in Canada (where the Bank of Canada explicitly 
targets inflation) and the United States (where the Federal Reserve does not explicitly 
target inflation). Here, I identify the inflation shock as a supply shock that forces the 
central bank to choose between inflation stability and output stability. If a central bank 
(e.g. the Bank of Canada) adopts an explicit inflation-targeting framework, then when 
inflation shocks occur, the central bank chooses to minimize inflation variability (at the 
cost of output variability); in this case, inflation expectations will be anchored. However, 
if the central bank (e.g. the Federal Reserve) does not adopt an explicit inflation-targeting 
framework, the central bank could more easily choose to minimize output variability (at 
the cost of inflation variability); in this case, inflation expectations will not be anchored. 
Because commodity prices are relatively flexible, I use them as an indicator of the 
commodity market’s perception of central bank credibility. Unlike most goods prices, 
which are sticky in the short run and can only reflect looseness or tightness of monetary 
policy in the long run, commodity prices adjust immediately in response to aggregate 
shocks. And, importantly, commodity prices respond differently according to whether or 
not the market perceives the central bank as a credible inflation fighter.  Therefore, the 
response of commodity prices to inflation shocks can be used to determine whether 
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inflation expectations are anchored or not; anchored expectations reflect central bank 
credibility.  
In summary, in this thesis, I estimate central bank credibility under alternative 
monetary policy frameworks: namely, inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting. I 
focus on Canada, which adopted an explicit IT framework, and the U.S., which did not 
(during my sample period). In February 1991, the Bank of Canada announced its inflation 
target, aiming to reduce the inflation from the 5 to 6 percent level to around a 2 percent 
level by 1995. Before that, by the fourth quarter of 1990, the inflation rate had reached 
4.2 percent from a high of 5.5 percent in early 1989 (Figure 1). In addition, the Canadian 
economy was in recession in 1990, when inflation pressures lessened somewhat. By 
1993, inflation actually undershot the target range and maintained the level below or 
close to 2 percent since then, as shown in Figure 1 (Bernanke et al., 1999). 
Figure 1: Unemployment, inflation and interest rates in Canada, 1972-2005 
 
Source: OECD main economic indicators 
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Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve did not adopt an inflation-targeting framework, 
at least not explicitly.  Rather, the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve was informed 
by a dual mandate to maintain both high employment and low and stable inflation. In the 
event, in the 1990s, inflation in the US was around 3 percent (Figure 2), slightly higher 
than that in Canada. And, the unemployment rate peaked at around 7.6 percent in 1992 
and then dropped to below 6 percent after 1994 (Figure 2), which was much lower than 
that in Canada at that time. By 1998, the unemployment rate in the US was 
approximately half of that in Canada (Goodfiriend, 2005). 
Figure 2: Unemployment, inflation and interest rates in the U.S., 1972-2005 
 
Source: OECD main economic indicators 
In summary, because of its explicit adoption of an inflation-targeting framework, 
the Bank of Canada announced numerical targets for inflation and adopted a more 
transparent policy that, to this day, entails fairly detailed communication with the public.  
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Thus, I hypothesize that the Bank of Canada is credibly committed to its inflation target. 
In contrast, the monetary policy for the United States was not transparent and 
communication between the Federal Reserve and the public was relatively poor. Since 
the 1990s, the Fed seems to have settled on an implicit inflation-targeting framework for 
its monetary policy. Presumably, because the framework is implicit, it lacks transparency 
and is less communicative than the Canadian framework. Thus, I estimate whether the 
explicit adoption of an inflation-targeting framework afforded the Bank of Canada 
credibility, and whether the Federal Reserve lacks such credibility. 
The working hypothesis of this study is that the central bank that adopted an 
explicit inflation-targeting framework achieved a relatively high degree of credibility 
both relative to its own past and to the comparable central bank that did not adopt an 
explicit inflation-targeting framework. Specifically, my working hypothesis is that the 
Bank of Canada is, in the inflation-targeting period, the more credible of the two central 
banks. To test this working hypothesis I pursue four objectives. The first objective is to 
demonstrate how changes of commodity prices reflect the market’s expectations of 
inflation. To achieve the first objective, I explore a relationship between commodity 
prices and interest rates. This relationship reveals how real commodity prices respond to 
changes in interest. The second objective is to demonstrate how credible and non-credible 
central banks adjust the policy instrument (interest rate) in response to inflation shocks. 
To achieve the second objective, I specify a macroeconomic model in which central-bank 
preferences inform a Taylor-rule specification that ultimately relates news of inflation 
shocks to the real interest rate. The third objective is to model how the central bank 
policy framework—inflation targeting or otherwise—determines the market’s 
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perceptions about the stance of monetary policy. To achieve the third objective, I use an 
optimal policy rule to explore how the central bank policy framework determines its 
credibility for low and stable inflation. The fourth objective is to use an event-study 
approach to estimate how commodity and foreign exchange prices respond to inflation 
announcements.  Based on my model, if the central bank’s commitment to low and stable 
inflation is credible, commodity and foreign exchange prices should respond negatively 
to inflation announcements. 
This paper consists of five chapters including this introduction. This first chapter 
introduces the purpose of this study and show how the study is proposed. This chapter 
also provides the central hypothesis and objectives to conduct the study. The second 
chapter reviews the extant literature relevant to this study. The third chapter provides the 
research design and empirical models that I use to analyze my central hypothesis. This 
chapter also includes the definitions and descriptions of the data I use for this study. The 
fourth chapter provides the analysis of the data and reports the empirical results. This 
chapter also provides many of the tables and figures needed to describe the results. 
Finally, the fifth chapter provides the conclusions from the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many studies examine the effects of aggregate shocks on commodity prices. 
Aggregate shocks include monetary policy shocks in the forms of, say, money supply 
surprises in 1980s (Frankel & Hardouvelis, 1985) and federal funds rates target shocks in 
the 1990s (Gospodinov & Jamali, 2013).  Aggregate shocks also include supply shocks, 
which force central banks to choose between low and stable inflation and sustained 
output growth, because such shocks move inflation and output in opposite directions. In 
contrast, demand shocks move inflation and output in the same direction and, thus, do not 
force central banks to choose between inflation and output objectives (Cecchetti et al., 
2002).   
Aggregate shocks can affect commodity prices by changing expected real interest 
rates or expected inflation. Whether the shock changes real interest rates or expected 
inflation depends on the market’s perception of the stance of monetary policy. If a central 
bank is perceived as credibly committed to low and stable inflation, then the market will 
regard the inflationary effects of a supply shock as transitory, because the market reasons 
that the central bank will reverse these effects.  In this case, expected real interest rates 
rise while inflation expectations remain unchanged (or anchored). However, if a central 
bank is not credibly committed to low and stable inflation, then the market will regard the 
inflation effects of a supply shock as permanent, because the market reasons that the 
central bank will not reverse these effects.  In this case, expected real interest rates do not 
rise because nominal interest rate rise only one-for-one with expectations of inflation.  
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In a seminal article, Frankel (1985) proposed that commodity prices should be 
studied as an important indicator of inflationary expectations, because, in response to 
aggregate shocks, commodity prices adjust faster than the (relatively sluggish) prices of 
manufactured goods and services. As early as the 1970s, Okun (1975) argued all goods 
could be divided into two sectors: customer goods and auction goods. Following Okun, 
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) renamed these two sectors manufactured goods (and 
services) and basic commodities (or agricultural and mineral commodities), and assumed 
the key distinction between these two sectors was that the former are differentiated 
products traded in imperfectly competitive markets, so their prices are sticky in the short 
run; meanwhile, the latter are homogenous products traded in perfectly competitive 
markets, thus their prices are flexible and, thus, adjust instantaneously to aggregate 
shocks. According to this assumption, any effects of monetary policy announcements on 
commodity prices likely occur shortly after the announcement. 
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) and Frankel (1986) emphasize the important role 
of expectations in the price formation process when money supply shocks occur; this 
research reflects the emphasis at that time that policymakers and researches placed on the 
monetary aggregates. In particular, suppose the Federal Reserve Board announced an 
unintended increase in the growth rate of the money supply.  If the market perceived this 
increase as an indication that the Fed would maintain this higher growth rate, the market 
would revise its expectations of inflation upward. Consequently, commodity prices would 
rise, as investors shifted out of money and into commodities. In contrast, if the market 
perceived this increase as an indication that the Fed would contract the money supply and 
thus reverse the effects of the shock, the market would not revise its expectations of 
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inflation. However, the market would expect a rise in the real interest rate.  Consequently, 
commodity prices would fall.  
Thorbecke and Zhang (2009) find that in the 1970s and after 1989, federal funds 
rate target increases raised and lowered gold and silver prices, respectively. They 
attributed these inverse responses of gold and silver prices to the fund rate increases in 
the two different periods to different inflation expectations. In particular, they argue that 
responses of market participants to the increase of the federal funds rate depend on how 
these participants interpret the Fed’s credibility. For the period of the 1970s, Thorbecke 
and Zhang (2009) agree with C. D. Romer and Romer (2000) that the Federal Reserve 
had private information about future inflation and thus the market would rely only on the 
Fed’s forecasts. When the federal funds rate increased, market participants would infer 
that an expansionary monetary policy was likely to occur in the near future because they 
thought the Federal Reserve would not hit its target, and therefore they revised their 
inflation expectations upward. Thus, in the 1970s, federal funds rate increases led to 
higher inflation expectations, which in turn raised commodity prices. Whereas, for the 
period after 1989, the authors agree with Gurkaynak et al. (2003) that surprise increases 
in the federal funds rate target raised (short-term) real interest rates and lowered future 
inflation expectations because the Federal Reserve had earned more credibility than it had 
in the 1970s. This is to say, faced with an increase in the federal funds rate, market 
participants believed in the Fed’s inflation-fighting credibility; thus, they revised their 
inflation expectations lower. High interest rates led to higher real interest rates and lower 
inflation expectations. Both of these responses worked to lower commodity prices.  
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To sum up, the effect of federal funds rate increases on expected inflation may 
have varied over time; and the effect has depended on the Fed’s credibility in fighting 
inflation. When, in the 1970s, the Fed’s anti-inflationary policies were not credible, long-
term expected inflation increased, which in turn drove up commodity prices. When, in the 
1990s, the Fed’s policies were credible, long-term expected inflation fell (because real 
interest rates rose), which in turn drove down commodity prices. 
According to Bernanke et al. (1999), central bank credibility in financial markets 
depends on delivering low and stable inflation. Inflation in the U.S. in the 1970s was high 
and volatile, while inflation since 1990 has been less volatile. Bernanke argues that the 
Fed’s credibility was much weaker in the 1970s than since the 1990s; this argument is 
consistent with the conclusion of Thorbecke and Zhang (2009): in response to the federal 
funds rate increases, gold and silver prices rose during 1970s because of the Fed’s poor 
credibility, which raised the expectations of inflation; whereas gold and silver prices fell 
after the1990s because of the Fed’s higher credibility, which raised real interest rates.  
Similarly, there are central-bank credibility studies based on the oil-price surges 
in the 1970s.  Authors of these studies attribute high oil prices to high inflation 
expectations. For example, Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue that in the 1970s oil prices 
tended to rise because loose monetary policy resulted in higher expectations of inflation. 
The higher inflation expectations in the 1970s seem to be consistent with Bernanke’s 
argument that inflation in the U.S. in the 1970s was high and volatile because the Federal 
Reserve lacked credibility in 1970s, so that inflation expectations would rise when supply 
shocks occurred (Bernanke et al., 1999). Similarly, Anzuini et al. (2010) examine the 
effect of monetary policy shocks on commodity prices, and also focus on the case of oil 
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to explore the channel through which monetary policy shocks influence commodity 
prices. The authors present empirical evidence suggesting that monetary policy shocks 
affect commodity prices mainly through market participants’ higher expectations of 
inflation. 
Cornell and French (1986) gauge the responses of real interest rates and expected 
inflation to surprises in the weekly money supply announcements between October 6, 
1977 and March 23, 1984. They find that expected inflation, as opposed to expected real 
interest rates, rose when the money supply rose unexpectedly. Armesto and Gavin (2005) 
also estimate the commodity futures market’s reaction to surprises in the Fed’s interest 
rate target. They show that during 1988-2001, short-term expected inflation responded 
positively and significantly to surprises in the federal funds rate target, whereas real 
interest rates did not respond to federal funds rate surprises. 
The above literature emphasizes how increases in the federal funds rate target 
raise commodity prices by increasing the market’s inflation expectations. When the Fed 
does not credibility commit to low and stable inflation, changes in the federal funds rate 
translate into changes in inflation expectations. In comparison, when the Fed credibly 
commits to low and stable inflation, changes in the federal funds rate translate into 
changes in the real interest rate. Under this situation, for example, a decrease in the 
federal funds rate lowers the real interest rate and, thereby, leads to higher commodity 
prices. 
Frankel (2006) demonstrates how changes in interest rates affect commodity 
prices through three channels: namely, inventories, speculation, and the incentive for 
13 
 
 
extracting commodities. More specifically, low interest rates reduce firms’ opportunity 
costs of carrying inventories and thereby increase firms’ demand for storable 
commodities. Additionally, low interest rates entice speculators to sell interest-earning 
financial assets and buy commodities because financial assets become less attractive 
when interest rates are low. Finally, low interest rates create a disincentive to extract 
exhaustible commodities today because of the decreased opportunity cost of delaying 
extraction. 
Based on the above channels, Frankel (2006) provides empirical evidence of a 
negative relationship between real commodity prices and real interest rates. He relates 
surges in commodity prices to looser Federal Reserve monetary policy, and concludes 
that reductions in interest rates could increase commodity prices by decreasing the real 
interest rate. In his work he emphasizes an overshooting model and attributes the rise in 
commodity prices to market responses to monetary policy surprises. Similarly, Taylor 
(2009) presents a monetary explanation for the peaks in commodity prices. He argues that 
oil prices increased in 2007 and 2008 because the Federal Open Market Committee 
reduced interest rates, which caused the real interest rate to fall. 
Gospodinov and Jamali (2013) test how federal funds rate shocks affect 
individual commodity prices for the metals and energy groups as well as commodity 
price indexes in the period of 1990 to 2009. Based on several empirical tests, the authors 
find that surprise decreases in the federal funds rate tend to increase individual and 
aggregate commodity prices. They also find that the decrease in the federal funds rate 
raises both nominal and real prices of commodities. These, together, seem to suggest that 
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in the period of 1990 to 2009, the decrease in the federal funds rate affected commodity 
prices through a decrease in the real interest rate. This is consistent with Frankel (2006). 
Despite the vast literature on the effect of money supply announcements or 
federal funds rate target changes on commodity prices, there is little work on the effect of 
inflation (or price) shocks on commodity prices. The current norm in monetary policy is 
the inflation-targeting framework. So studying how commodity prices respond to 
inflation shocks under an inflation-targeting framework is sensible. 
 Bernanke et al. (1999) describe inflation-targeting frameworks and identify 
important reasons for adopting these frameworks. The authors state that in an inflation 
targeting framework, a central bank announces numerical targets for inflation and 
specifies that controlling inflation is a long-run goal of monetary policy. Another 
common feature is a specific policy for bringing inflation back to target in circumstances 
where the central bank has missed the target. Also, inflation-targeting central banks often 
adopt a relatively transparent policy approach that entails fairly detailed communication 
with the public.  
Bernanke et al. (1999) also discuss the framework of the Bank of Canada’s 
inflation targeting process and show how, when, and why the Bank of Canada adopted its 
targets. The authors explain that John Crow, the governor of the Bank of Canada in 1988, 
made it clear that the long-run monetary policy objective for the Bank of Canada should 
be price stability, which central bankers generally define as low and stable inflation. 
After substantial progress in reducing the inflation rate was already evident, the Bank of 
Canada announced, in February 1991, its inflation-targeting framework. Since then, 
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several countries have adopted inflation targeting, and no country has abandoned it. A 
noted exception to this group is the United States, where the framework for monetary 
policy is informed by a dual mandate to maintain both high employment and low and 
stable inflation.  However, inflation targeting has many advocates in the United States. 
Those advocates argue that the economy could benefit from an inflation-targeting 
framework, which ensures low and stable inflation by enhancing central bank credibility.  
This enhanced credibility affords the central bank flexibility to stabilize the real 
economy. In any case, by the late 1990s, the United States seemed to settle on an implicit 
inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy (Goodfiriend, 2005). 
Modern central banks set—explicitly or implicitly—inflation targets and follow 
interest-rate rules with the aim of achieving these targets. In order to achieve a medium 
term target of inflation or some combination of inflation and real economy activity 
targets, central banks adjust a near-term policy instrument, such as the short-term interest 
rate, in response to inflation shocks. This adjustment in general follows some specific 
monetary policy rules. For example, Taylor (1999) analyzed interest rate rules that 
describe how the Federal Reserve adjusts the federal funds rate in response to the state of 
the economy.  When there is an inflation shock, such that the actual inflation rate exceeds 
the target inflation rate, according to Taylor, in order to keep its inflation target, the 
Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy; this tightening should raise the federal funds 
rate by more than one-for-one with the increase in the inflation rate. This is to say, Taylor 
(1993) argues monetary policy should move the interest rate in the same direction and by 
a greater amount than observed movements in inflation—this is called the Taylor 
principle. By following the Taylor principle, inflation reverts to its equilibrium (target-
16 
 
 
value) quickly. That is, in response to inflation shocks central banks increase the nominal 
interest rate more than one for one with the rise in the inflation rate. Thus, the rise in the 
nominal interest rate corresponds to a rise in the real interest rate. The resulting co-
movements between inflation and the real interest rate render inflation shocks transitory.  
An inflation shock is a supply shock.  Supply shocks force the central bank to 
choose to minimize either inflation or output variability. In other words, in response to a 
supply shock, minimizing inflation variability is costly in terms of output variability. 
Cecchetti et al. (2002) demonstrate how aggregate supply shocks force a central bank to 
implement monetary policy according to its preferences regarding inflation and output 
variability. In particular, by modeling dynamic relationships between output, inflation, 
and the short-term interest rate, the authors demonstrate how the central bank adjusts its 
policy instrument (short-term interest rate) to achieve an optimal combination of low and 
stable inflation and sustained economic growth. 
In the inflation-targeting framework, in response to a supply shock, a central bank 
must choose to minimize inflation variability if it is credibly committed to its inflation 
target. When a central bank chooses to minimize inflation variability, it follows the 
Taylor principle to raise the real interest rate in response to a positive inflation shock. 
In summary, a central bank’s policy framework—inflation targeting or 
otherwise—is informed by the central bank’s preference regarding inflation and output 
variability, which in turn determines whether the Taylor principle holds.  As the literature 
I have reviewed here reveals, although the effects of monetary supply shocks on 
commodity prices have been widely studied, the effect of aggregate supply shocks, 
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particularly inflation shocks, remains largely unexplored. As I demonstrate in a model I 
propose in chapter 3, how inflation shocks affect commodity prices reveals the extent of 
central bank credibility and, thus, the effectiveness of a given monetary policy 
framework—inflation-targeting or otherwise.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 In this chapter, I present how this study is designed. At the beginning of this 
chapter, I introduce the theoretical background on which the estimation model is based. 
Then I specify how I structure empirical models that are used to test the working 
hypothesis of this study. Finally, I provide definitions and descriptions of the data I use in 
this study. In the appendix, I present detailed derivations associated with the model and 
additional tables associated with the data. 
3.1 Background 
 Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) test the credibility of the Federal Reserve 
regarding its commitment to money growth targets through the reactions of commodity 
prices to money supply announcements. Following Okun (1975), the authors emphasize 
that commodity prices, unlike most manufactured goods prices that are sticky in the short 
run, adjust quickly—“even from minute to minute” (Frankel & Hardouvelis, 1985)—in 
response to monetary policy shocks. Thus, because commodity prices are flexible, they 
should clearly indicate how inflation expectations respond to money supply shocks. If 
market participants expect higher money supply growth, and consequently higher 
inflation, they will shift out of money and into commodities, thus driving up commodity 
prices; in this case, central bank credibility (as an inflation fighter) is low. In contrast, if 
market participants expect lower money supply growth, and consequently lower inflation, 
they will shift into money and out of commodities, thus driving down commodity prices; 
in this case, central bank credibility is high (Frankel & Hardouvelis, 1985). In other 
words, commodity prices are positively related to inflation expectations, which reflect 
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central bank credibility. For this reason, Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) propose to test 
central bank credibility through the reactions of commodity prices to news of monetary 
policy shocks in the form of unexpected changes in the money supply. Specifically, when 
an unexpected increase in the money supply is announced, and market participants 
believe the central bank is committed to its monetary target, they expect the central bank 
to counteract this increase—and, thus, tighten the money supply by raising the nominal 
interest rate—in the near future. Because the nominal interest rate equals the real interest 
rate plus expected inflation (money growth rate), market participants’ expectations of 
tightening monetary conditions cause the real interest rate to rise as well. The higher real 
interest rate leads market participants to shift into interest-earning financial assets and out 
of commodities, driving down commodity prices. In contrast, if market participants do 
not believe the central bank is committed to its monetary target, they do not expect the 
central bank to counteract the unexpected increase in the money supply.  Rather, they 
regard the unexpected increase in the money supply as an indicator of the central bank’s 
new, looser monetary policy; thus, participants revise their inflation expectations upward. 
They shift out of interest-earning financial assets and into commodities, driving up 
commodity prices.  
In summary, the public’s expectations of inflation for the near future are related to 
the central bank’s credibility, and these expectations are revealed in the behavior of 
commodity prices. Following news of a positive monetary policy shock, the real interest  
rate rises and inflation expectations do not change if central bank monetary policy is 
credibly committed to low and stable inflation; whereas, the real interest rate does not 
change and inflation expectations rise if policy is not credibly committed. Although the 
20 
 
 
nominal interest rate rises in both cases, commodity prices respond unambiguously: 
commodity prices fall if the central bank is credibly committed and rise otherwise.   
Following the seminal work of Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985), I design this 
study to test central bank credibility at the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve  
under alternative monetary policy regimes; I do so by testing the reactions of commodity 
and foreign exchange prices to inflation shocks. Unlike the money supply shocks studied 
by Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985), inflation shocks are supply shocks.  In the context of 
monetary policy, supply shocks differ from demand shocks in one key respect: demand 
shocks move inflation and output in the same direction, whereas supply shocks force 
policymakers to choose to minimize either inflation or output variability. In other words, 
in response to a supply shock, minimizing inflation variability is costly in terms of output 
variability.  
In my study, I focus on the effect of inflation shocks, because modern central 
banks do not target the money supply; rather, most target some combination of inflation 
and real economic activity. Therefore, rather than following the specific approach that 
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) take, I develop my own model to estimate how inflation 
shocks affect commodity and foreign exchange prices. In particular, the model 
demonstrates conditions under which commodity and foreign exchange prices will fall in 
response to a rise in the real interest rate. As I explain below, this relationship between 
asset prices and inflation shocks can reveal whether expected inflation is well anchored 
under an inflation-targeting policy relative to some other monetary policy framework. 
First I explore how real commodity prices are related to real interest rates by using the 
same approach as Frankel (2006). Then, based on a macroeconomic model, I investigate 
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how news of inflation shocks affects real interest rates, which in turn affect commodity 
and foreign exchange prices.  
3.2 Empirical Model 
3.2.1 Real Interest Rates and Real Commodity Prices  
 To test whether market expectations of inflation are anchored, I explore a 
relationship between commodity prices and interest rates by following Frankel (2006), 
who takes the relationship from Dornbusch (1976), who models the relationship between 
foreign-exchange prices and interest rates. As in Dornbusch (1976), I first reproduce the 
essential features of this relationship for a small, open economy with perfect capital 
mobility. In this case, if the domestic currency is expected to depreciate, the domestic 
interest rate on asset, i, must equal to the foreign interest rate, *i , plus the expected rate 
of depreciation of the domestic currency, x , which is specified in Equation 1. 
 xii += *                                                               )1(  
In addition, the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, x , is proportional 
to the difference between the log of the current exchange rate, e , and the log of the long-
run exchange rate, e , which is specified in Equation 2, where 0>θ . 
)( eex −−= θ                                                          )2(  
Substituting Equation 2 into Equation 1 yields Equation 3.  
)(
1 *iiee −−=−
θ
                                                     )3(  
22 
 
 
According to Equation 3, the difference between current and long-run exchange rates is 
inversely proportional to the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates. That 
is, a higher domestic interest rate relative to the foreign interest rate will appreciate the 
domestic currency, so the domestic currency price of foreign exchange falls below its 
long-run equilibrium value until the expected depreciation of the domestic currency 
exactly offsets the increase in domestic interest rate. Thus, the current exchange rate, 
defined here as the domestic currency price of a foreign currency—that is, units of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency—is inversely proportional to the domestic 
interest rate. 
 Based on Dornbusch (1976), Frankel (2006) argues that commodity prices also 
overshoot in response to monetary policy shocks because commodities, like foreign 
exchange, are flexible-price goods in both the short and long run. Thus, Frankel (2006) 
substitutes commodity prices for exchange rates and the convenience yield for the foreign 
interest rate as specified in Equation 4; here, the domestic interest, i, equals a 
convenience yield, c , which I assume is constant, plus the expected change in the 
commodity price, ts
1. 
ttt sEci ∆+=                                                         )4(  
 Next, I assume regardless of how the real commodity price departs from its long-
run value in response to a supply shock, the price will return to its long-run equilibrium 
value according to market participants’ rational expectations. As specified in Equation 5, 
                                                 
1 c is comprised of the convenience yield, which reflects the benefits of holding 
commodity inventories minus storage costs and a risk premium for carrying commodity 
inventories. 
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the expected change in the real commodity price, )( ttt psE −∆ , is proportional to the 
difference between the log of the current real commodity price, tq , and the log of the 
long-run real commodity price, q , where psq −= , and p is the aggregate price level. 
)(][)]([ qqqps ttttt −−=∆Ε≡−∆Ε θ                                       )5(  
Combining Equation 4 and 5, by eliminating tt sE ∆ and writing tp∆ as 1+tpi , yields 
Equation 6. 
)(
1
1 cEiqq tttt −−−=− +piθ
                                            )6(  
In Equation 6, the left side is the real commodity price, which is measured relative to its 
long run equilibrium value, and the right side is the real interest rate, which is measured 
relative to the convenience yield. According to Equation 6, the real commodity price, tq , 
is inversely proportional to the real interest rate, 1+− ttt Ei pi .  
Following Equation 6, and for the sake of demonstration, I test the relationship 
between real interest rates and real commodity prices over the period of 1972 to 2005 for 
Canada and the U.S. I use data of monthly long-term interest rates, the core Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), commodity price indexes and producer-price indexes for all 
commodities.  I obtain the monthly long-term interest rate and core CPI from OECD 
Main Economic Indicators (OECD-MEI) for both Canada and the United States. I 
compute the monthly inflation rate from the monthly core CPI, which excludes volatile 
food and energy sectors. I obtain the monthly data on commodity price indexes for 
Canada from the Bank of Canada. Because the U.S. commodity price index is 
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unavailable, I use the producer price index for all commodities instead.  I obtain the 
producer price index-commodities from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
To test this relationship, I regress real commodity prices on real interest rates. To 
compute real commodity prices, I take the log of the monthly commodity price index 
minus the log of the monthly core CPI. To compute real interest rates, I use Equation 7. 
                                                                 
)7(  
Where, is the real interest rate, is the monthly long-term interest rate, j stands for the 
month, and is the monthly inflation rate calculated as the 
same-month percentage change in the core CPI. 
After I get real commodity prices and real interest rates, I use OLS to estimate the 
relationship between the two datasets. The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4 for 
Canada and the U.S., respectively. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, real commodity prices 
are negatively related to real interest rates in both Canada and the U.S. Although in 
practice, this relationship may not hold precisely because many factors other than real 
interest rates potentially influence commodity prices, these figures provide some 
evidence that the negative relationship implied by Equation 6 (i.e., the real commodity 
price, , is inversely proportional to the real interest rates, ) is empirically 
valid. I report regression results in Table 1. 
 
100*)]ln()[ln( 12−−−= jjjj CPICPIir
jr ji
100*)]ln()[ln( 12−− jj CPICPI
tq 1+− ttt Ei pi
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Figure 3: Canadian Real Commodity Price Index vs. Real Interest Rate, monthly, 1972-
2005 
 
Sources: Bank of Canada; OECD-MEI. 
Figure 4: US Real Commodity Price Index2 vs. Real Interest Rate, monthly, 1972-2005 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; OECD-MEI. 
                                                 
2The US commodity price index is represented by producer price index in all 
commodities. 
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Table 1: Regression of real commodity prices on real interest rates 
Real Commodity Price Index and Real Interest Rate 
Sample: 1972-2005 (408 monthly observations) 
real commodity prices in log units and real interest rates in % 
Country Constant Coefficient t-statistic P-value R-squared 
Canada 1.781 -0.030*** -6.55 0.000 0.096 
(0.021) (0.005) 
U.S. 0.609 -0.014*** -3.61 0.000 0.031 
  (0.014) (0.004)       
Notes: *** indicates significance of coefficient at the 1% level 
           (Standard errors are given in parentheses.) 
Sources: Bank of Canada; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;         
OECD-MEI. 
 
The coefficients in Table 1 represent the percentage change in real commodity 
prices due to a one-percentage point change in real interest rates. For Canada, a one 
percentage point increase in real interest rates is related to a 3 percent decline in real 
commodity prices. For the U.S., a one percentage point increase in real interest rates is 
related to a 1.4 percent decline in real commodity prices. For both countries, real 
commodity prices are negatively related to the real interest rates. The t-statistics indicate 
that the negative relationships are significant at the 1 percent level for both countries. In 
each case, the small R-squared together with the large t-statistic value indicate that the 
real interest rate is related to real commodity prices, but, not surprisingly, little of the 
variation in commodity prices is explained by variation in real interest rates. There are 
many other factors in addition to real interest rates that potentially explain real 
commodity prices, including weather, political vicissitudes, and so on. 
Equation 6 shows that commodity prices could, in principle, reveal how market 
participants perceive the stance of central bank monetary policy. This is to say, if market 
27 
 
 
participants interpret a supply-shock induced inflation surprise as a new, looser monetary 
policy that the central bank has chosen not to reverse, participants will raise their 
expectations of inflation  ( 1+ttE pi ), and thereby the nominal interest rate ( ti ) will rise one 
for one with expected inflation; consequently, the real interest rate ( 1+− ttt Ei pi ) will not 
change and, accordingly, the real commodity price ( tq ) will not respond to the 
announcement of the shock. In contrast, if market participants interpret the inflation 
surprise as a one-time event that the central bank will reverse, they will expect the central 
bank to raise the real interest rate ( 1+− ttt Ei pi ) by raising the nominal interest rate ( ti ) 
without any change of their expectations of inflation ( 1+ttE pi ); consequently, the real 
commodity price ( tq ) will fall below its long-run equilibrium until the expected rise in 
the commodity price offsets the higher expected real interest rate.  
In summary, the nominal interest rate could increase [decrease] because expected 
inflation increases [decreases] or because the expected real interest rate increases 
[decreases]. Identifying which increase [decrease] is responsible for the nominal interest 
rate increase [decrease] identifies the market’s perception of the central bank’s 
credibility. In other words, identifying the cause of the nominal interest rate increase—
expected inflation or the expected real interest rate—could reveal whether the central 
bank has credibly anchored the public’s expectations of inflation. I hypothesize that the 
Bank of Canada anchored expected inflation because the adoption of an inflation-
targeting framework affords the Bank of Canada credibility, whereas, the Federal 
Reserve did not anchor expected inflation to the extent that Canada did because the Fed 
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did not explicitly adopt an inflation-targeting framework (during my sample period). 
Next, I introduce a macroeconomic model to test this hypothesis. 
3.2.2 Monetary Policy and Real Interest Rates 
Based on Galí (2008) and D. Romer (2012), I specify a macroeconomic model in 
which central-bank preferences inform a Taylor-rule specification that ultimately relates 
news of inflation shocks to the real interest rate. To begin, I assume a household of an 
infinitely lived representative agent who maximizes the objective function specified in 
Equation 8, subject to the budget constraint specified in Equation 9. 
∑
∞
=0
0 ),(
t
tt
t NCUE β                                                     )8(  
ttttttt NWBBDCP +≤+ −1                                                )9(  
Where, tC represents the quantity consumed of the single good, and tN represents 
working hours of household members. The marginal utility of consumption tcU , , is 
assumed to be positive and diminishing, while the marginal disutility of working, tnU ,− , is 
positive and increasing.  For t=0, 1, 2……, tP  
is the price of the consumption good, thus, 
ttCP  
represents total consumption expenditures. Additionally, tB represents the quantity 
of one-period, nominally riskless discount bonds purchased in period tand maturing in 
period 1+t . Each bond pays one unit of money at maturity and its price is tD , where
i
Dt +
≡
1
1
. Lastly, tW  
represents the nominal wage. 
29 
 
 
Utility takes the form specified in Equation 10. 
          ϕσ
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+
+
−
=
+−
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tt
tt
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NCU                                                )10(  
In this case, a standard variational argument yields the Euler equation specified in 
Equation 11. 
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Taking logs and linearizing the Euler equation yields Equation 12: 
                                             ])1ln[(
1
lnln 1 βσ ttt rCC +−= +                                         )12(  
To get this expression into a more tractable form, I introduce three simplifications. First, I 
substitute tY  for tC  using the fact that all production is consumed. Second, for small 
values of r, rr ≈+ )1ln( ; thus, I replace )1ln( r+ with r .  Finally, I suppress the constant 
term, β
σ
ln
1
− .  
These changes yield a simplified new Keynesian IS curve specified in Equation 13. 
tttt ryEy σ
1
)( 1 −= +                                          )13(  
This new Keynesian IS curve shows that output is inversely related to the real interest 
rate in the goods market. Specifically, an increase in the real interest rate reduces the 
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quantity of investment because the cost of borrowing for investment is higher. The 
reduction in planned investment lowers planned expenditure, which in turn lowers output. 
In addition, I assume the central bank follows the (Taylor) interest-rate rule specified in 
Equation 14, where ti is the nominal interest rate, which according to the Fisher effect is 
specified in Equation 15. 
ttt byai += pi                                                   )14(  
)( 1++= tttt Eri pi                                                      )15(                            
In Equation 14, tpi and ty represent inflation and output, each relative to its long-run 
equilibrium values, the logs of which are normalized to zero in this model. This interest-
rate rule stipulates how much the central bank should change the nominal interest rate in 
response to changes in inflation and output. In particular, the rule stipulates that for each 
one-percent increase in inflation, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate 
by more than one percentage point (i.e. 1>a )—this is called the Taylor principle.   
In Equation 15, tr is the real interest rate, and )( 1+ttE pi is the expected inflation rate. 
Finally, I model the supply side of the economy with the Phillips curve specified in 
Equation 163. 
s
ttttt yE ελpipi ++= )(                                                )16(  
                                                 
3 A popular alternative to this Phillips curve is the so-called new Keynesian Phillips curve, 
and a big difference in New Keynesian Phillips curve compared to the standard Phillips 
curve is that it depends on expected future inflation, instead of expected current inflation, 
i.e. )( 1+ttE pi instead of )( ttE pi . 
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The Phillips curve shows that the inflation rate depends on three forces: namely, expected 
inflation rate, the deviation of output from its natural level, and supply shocks. 
Because I use this model to demonstrate how supply shocks (
s
tε ), which force the central 
bank to choose to stabilize inflation or output, affect the real interest rate in the short run, 
I further simplify the IS curve (Equation 13): I suppress the expected-output term and set
1=σ ; the result is Equation 17. 
tt ry −=                                                             )17(  
Additionally, I assume inflation expectations are adaptive, i.e., 1)( −= tttE pipi . The 
adaptive expectations of inflation impose the condition that disinflation is costly in terms 
of output; otherwise, the central bank’s choice to mitigate inflation is not a difficult one. 
Combining Equation 14, 15, and 17 by eliminating ti and ty yields Equation 18, which 
relates the real interest rate to the inflation rate.  
tt
b
a
r pi
+
−
=
1
1
                                                         )18(  
Equation 18 implies that in the case where 1>a , the Taylor principle holds. That is, in 
response to an inflation shock, the real interest rate rises to cool the economy; in this 
case, the nominal interest rate increases more than one for one with the inflation rate.  
Moreover, in the case where a >1, the solution for the inflation rate is specified in 
Equation 19.  
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Thus, the steady-state inflation rate is zero: the effects of supply shocks on inflation do 
not persist when a >1. 
Finally, because Equation 18 holds in every period, in Equation 20 I express the real 
interest rate in terms of unanticipated inflation (i.e., the inflation shock), 1−− tt pipi . 
)(
1
1
11 −− −+
−
+= tttt
b
a
rr pipi                                              )20(  
 Equation 20 implies that when 1>a , the inflation shock leads the central bank to 
raise the real interest rate; and this rise of the real interest rate increases along with the 
magnitude of a . When 1=a , the inflation shock does not affect the real interest rate; 
rather, the unanticipated rise in inflation effectively reflects a new normal. In other 
words, it is crucial to know the magnitude (relative to 1) of a  in order to characterize the 
credibility of the central bank. Specifically, if the central bank is credible, then a positive 
inflation shock raises the real interest rate, 1>a . The a  is an interest-rate rule parameter 
specified in Equation 14 and is associated with the Taylor principle. In the next section, 
following Cecchetti et al. (2002), I use an optimal policy rule to explore how the central 
bank policy framework—inflation targeting or otherwise—determines the magnitudes of
a . 
3.2.3 The Optimal Policy Rule 
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 Normally, a central bank conducts monetary policy by setting a near-term policy 
instrument, such as a nominal interest rate, in order to achieve over the medium term its 
optimal combination of low and stable inflation and sustained economic growth. In 
practice, the use of an interest rate as the main policy instrument has often taken place in 
conjunction with some inflation target. In other words, policymakers set—explicitly or 
implicitly—an inflation target and change interest rates with the aim of achieving such a 
target. In addition, as Cecchetti et al. (2002) demonstrate, a central bank endeavors to 
achieve this optimal outcome subject to the constraints imposed on it by the dynamic 
structure of the economy—in particular, the dynamic relationships between output, 
inflation, and the short-term interest rate.  
 In the context of the model I specify above, we can think of the nominal interest-
rate rule (Equation 14) as the solution to an optimization problem in which the central 
bank minimizes Equation 21, the expected value of a loss function that is quadratic in 
(log) output deviations from trend ( ty ) and inflation deviations from target ( tpi ), where, 
in this case, the output trend and the inflation target are both normalized to zero. Equation 
22 and 23 specify the constraints imposed by the dynamic structure of the economy. 
])1([ 22 yEL ααpi −+=                                                )21(  
ttt r ελpi +−=                                                        )22(  
)
1
( ttt ry εω
+−=                                                     )23(  
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 Here, ω−  is the slope of the aggregate demand curve and λ is the slope of the 
aggregate supply curve. According to Equation 22, the central bank offsets the 
inflationary effect of a supply shock by raising the (real) policy instrument ( tr ); 
meanwhile, according to Equation 23, the central bank offsets the recessionary effect of a 
supply shock by lowering the policy instrument. Thus, because a supply shock moves 
inflation and output in opposite directions, the central bank must choose to minimize 
either inflation or output variability. The central bank policy framework, reflected here by 
the term α in Equation 21, informs this choice. For example, when 1=α , the central bank 
minimizes inflation variability, only, and disregards output variability. 
 In this problem, the optimal interest-rate rule (Equation 14) generally takes the 
form in Equation 24, where the optimal policy instrument is a linear function of the 
supply shock. 
tt zr ε=                                                              )24(  
Substituting this optimal rule into Equations 22 and 23, taking the variances of output and 
inflation, and plugging these variances into Equation 21 yields the loss function in terms 
of z and the parameters of the model; minimizing this loss function with respect to z
yields z as a function of the slope of the aggregate demand curve ( ω− ), the slope of the 
aggregate supply curve ( )λ , and α .4 
                                                 
4 )1(
1
)1(
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ω
ααλ
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 Thus, the solution for α is expressed implicitly in Equation 25 in terms of the 
variability of output ( 2yσ ), the variability of inflation (
2
piσ ), and the slope of the aggregate 
supply curve ( λ ).  In Appendix I, I deriveα . 
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 Solving Equation 22 and 23 by eliminating tr and substituting the resulting 
expression for tε into Equation 24 yields a real-interest rate rule; thus, aand b in the 
corresponding nominal interest-rate rule specified in Equation 14 take the forms specified 
in Equation 26 and 27. 
λωαλα
ααλω
++−
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1
)1(
)1(
1
2
a                                         )26(  
)1( αλ −=b                                                    )27(  
Finally, replacing ω with the expression for it implied by the nominal interest-rate rule 
(Equation 14) and the IS curve (Equation 17), yields Equation 28. 
1
1
1
2
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a                                                 )28(  
 Equation 28 shows that as α approaches 0, a  approaches 1 and the Taylor 
principle does not hold. In contrast, as α  approaches 1, a  grows larger than 1 and the 
Taylor principle holds.  In this case, according to Equation 20, inflation shocks 
effectively raise the real interest rate because the central bank increases the nominal 
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interest rate more than one for one with the rise in the inflation rate. The resulting rise in 
the real interest rate in turn renders the inflation shock transitory. The value of α  
depends on the central bank’s choice; this is to say, in the face of inflation shocks, the 
central bank must choose to minimize inflation variability or output variability. In an 
inflation-targeting policy framework, the central bank’s commitment to maintain low and 
stable inflation is credible—α approaches 1 in Equation 28. 
3.2.4 Monetary Policy and Commodity Prices: A Test of Central Bank Credibility 
Equations 6, 20, and 28 are the three key equations of my model. From these 
equations, it is clear that real commodity and foreign exchange prices are inversely 
proportional to inflation shocks if 1>a ; in this case, agents reason the central bank is 
averse to inflation and, thus, the inflation shock is a one-off event the central bank 
reverses. In contrast, if agents reason the central bank is not averse to inflation, then α
approaches 0 so that aapproaches 1; the inflation shock reflects a new normal and real 
commodity and foreign exchange prices are unrelated to inflation shocks. Thus, testing 
the relationship between commodity and foreign exchange prices and inflation shocks is 
tantamount to testing the central bank’s credibility regarding its commitment to low and 
stable inflation. 
To test the relationship, I conduct regression analyses in which the percentage 
change in the individual commodity and foreign exchange prices are dependent variables 
and the percentage change in the inflation rate (immediately after the most-recent 
inflation statistic is made public) is the independent variable; thus, I estimate regressions 
of the form specified in Equation 29. 
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Where, ts∆  denotes changes of individual commodity and foreign exchange prices 
between the opening price on the day that the government announces the new inflation 
rate and the closing price one day before the announcement; tpi∆ represents inflation 
shocks; tε represents all other supply shocks except news of the inflation shock. Because 
this study is designed to test the immediate response (within several hours) of commodity 
and foreign currency prices to announcements of inflation shocks, the news regarding 
other supply disruptions is relatively unlikely to overwhelm asset-price responses to the 
inflation announcement.  
The sign of the coefficient, 1β , reflects central bank’s credibility. Estimates of 1β
should be negative if a central bank is credible, and nonnegative if the central bank is not 
credible. This is because that when an inflation shock occurs, an inflation-targeting 
central bank chooses to minimize inflation variability and, thus, raises the real interest 
rate. When the real interest rate rises, commodity prices and foreign-exchange prices fall 
as investors shift out of commodities and into money. Therefore, I expect a negative 
relationship between commodity and foreign-exchange prices and inflation shocks (
01 <β ) if the central bank is credible. Specifically, I expect the 1β  is negative for the 
post-IT period for Canada because the explicit adoption of inflation targeting afforded the 
Bank of Canada credibility. For the U.S., because the Federal Reserve implicitly adopted 
inflation targeting in the post-IT period, I expect some estimates of 1β  to be negative, as 
well; though, I expect evidence of credibility to be stronger for Bank of Canada. In 
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contrast, if the central bank is not credible, investors interpret the inflation shock as a new 
normal; they shift out of money and into commodity markets. Therefore, I expect a 
nonnegative relationship between commodity and foreign-exchange prices and inflation 
shocks ( 01 ≥β ) in the period of pre-IT for both Canada and the U.S.. 
3.3 Definitions and Descriptions of the Data 
In order to test responses of commodity and foreign exchange prices to inflation 
shocks, I use the data of individual commodity futures prices, the Canada/U.S. foreign 
exchange rate, the Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index (Major Currencies5), and the core 
CPI. Again, because it is less volatile, I use the core CPI to measure the inflation rate and 
the inflation shock. I define the inflation shock as the difference between the announced 
actual inflation rate and the expected inflation rate. I assume that the public formulates its 
expectation of the inflation rate in the next month based on the actual inflation rate in the 
current month. Based on this adaptive-expectation formulation, I treat the actual inflation 
rate in the current month as the expected inflation rate in the following month.  
The Canadian commodity price data consist of futures prices for canola oil and 
feed wheat traded on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange (WGE) between 1982 and 2005. The 
U.S. commodity price data consist of futures prices for corn, oats, soybeans, soybean 
meal, soybean oil, and wheat traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT/CMEGROUP) and spring wheat traded on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
(MGEX). I obtain the data of individual commodity futures prices (on a daily frequency) 
                                                 
5 A weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against a subset of 
the broad index currencies that circulate widely outside the country of issue. Major 
currencies index includes the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Australia, and Sweden. 
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from the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB). For each commodity, the futures prices 
are from futures contracts of varying maturities; these contracts may overlap at a moment 
in time. To compile the time series of commodity future prices, I use only the prices from 
the nearby future contract. In particular, beginning from the first day of the study period, 
I use the prices from the nearest maturing contract until the last day of that contract (i.e., 
the day when the maturity month is reached). Then, I use the prices from the next nearest 
maturing contract.  Repeating this until the last day of the study period, I construct the 
time series of each commodity’s futures price.  
For each commodity, the difference of commodity futures prices between the 
opening price on the day when the inflation rate is announced (once every month) and the 
closing price on the day before the new inflation rate is announced is the measure of the 
change of the commodity futures price for that month; this measure gauges how the 
market responds to the announcement of the inflation shock. In general, the opening price 
is the individual commodity futures price at 10:30am Eastern Time on the trading day on 
the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange for Canada and the Chicago Board of Trade and the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange for the US; the closing price is the individual commodity 
futures price at 2:15pm Eastern Time the day before. I obtain the inflation-rate release 
(announcement) dates from Statistics Canada and the US Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The monthly release dates of inflation rate are almost always different 
for each country. Both Canada and the U.S. release CPI data at 8:30am Eastern Time, 
which is two hours before the starting time of commodity futures trading. Within this 
time (2 hours), I reason the market has enough time to respond to the announcement of 
inflation—a response reflected in the opening prices of commodities—and little else.    
40 
 
 
I obtain the data on foreign exchange rates from the Federal Reserve Economic 
Database (FRED) at the daily frequency. The Canada / U.S. and the U.S. / Canada 
foreign exchange rates are used for Canada and the U.S., respectively. The Canada / U.S. 
and the U.S. / Canada foreign exchange rate are noon buying rates in New York City for 
cable transfers payable in foreign currencies. The noon rates are calculated to reflect the 
trades that take place between 11:59 a.m. and 12:01 p.m. and are updated by about 12:45 
p.m. ET at month-end and 12:30 p.m. ET on other business days, which is several hours 
after the inflation release time (8:30am ET); again, I measure its daily changes in these 
foreign exchange series in response to inflation shocks. Because the bulk of Canadian 
foreign trade (exports and imports) is always with the United States, the focus of 
attention for Canada is naturally the Canada / U.S. foreign exchange rate. I also use the 
Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index (Major Currencies) to measure the changes of the 
exchange rate for the U.S. The Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index is updated at about 
16:30 p.m. ET, I also measure its daily changes in response to inflation shocks. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, I report estimation results based on the models I specified in 
chapter 3. In addition, I present robustness checks to examine whether my model is 
effective in terms of testing the relationship between the announcement of inflation 
shocks and commodity and foreign-exchange prices.  
4.1 The impact of announcements of inflation shocks on commodity and foreign-
exchange prices 
I estimate the impact of inflation shocks on commodity and foreign-exchange 
prices to explore whether the inflation shocks affect commodity and foreign-exchange 
prices through the channel of real interest rates. In other words, if positive inflation 
shocks result in negative commodity and foreign-exchange price changes through the 
channel of higher real interest rates, then expected inflation is anchored; thus, the 
inflation-targeting framework is credible.  
In the case of Canada and the US, because the Bank of Canada explicitly adopted 
an inflation-targeting framework while the Federal Reserve System did not, I hypothesize 
that, after adopting its inflation-targeting framework, the Bank of Canada earned 
credibility that the Federal Reserve System continued to lack. To test this hypothesis, I 
estimate the effect of inflation shocks on commodity and foreign-exchange prices in 
Canada and the United States over the period of 1982 to 2005. Additionally, to gain 
insight into how monetary policy is perceived over time, I divide the sample period into 
two distinct sub-periods representing different monetary policy regimes. The first period 
is 1982 to 1991 and the second period is 1996 to 2005. I end the first sub period in 1991, 
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when the Bank of Canada explicitly announced that it had adopted an inflation-targeting 
framework for its monetary policy. However, the Canadian inflation-targeting framework 
did not mature until early 1993 (Bernanke et al., 1999). So the two subsamples represent 
pre-IT and post-IT policy regimes, respectively. As such, the two subsamples offer a 
useful, natural experiment with which to compare monetary policies in the two countries 
over time. 
In order to investigate the response of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to 
an inflation shock, I estimate regression equations of the form specified in Equation 28. I 
structure the data so that the announcement of inflation takes place prior to the market’s 
open, so the dependent variable is calculated as 100 times the difference between the 
natural log of the opening price directly after the announcement of inflation and the 
natural log of the closing price just prior to the announcement.  In each month, the 
inflation data are released at 8:30am Eastern Time, which is two hours earlier than the 
market’s open (10:30am). So I assume the announcement effects of inflation shocks on 
commodity futures prices and foreign exchange prices occur on the day when the actual 
inflation rate is released. I also assume that, aside from the inflation announcement, no 
other relevant information is released between the market close and the following day’s 
open, or if other information is released it is of a random nature and, thus, captured by the 
error term in my regression specification.  Nevertheless, given the relatively small role 
that inflation shocks play in shaping commodity price movements, I expect relatively low 
R-squared estimates.  
 I calculate the inflation shock using Equation 33:  
ts∆
43 
 
 
   (33)   
where t represents the year, and j represents the month. In this equation, I use the actual 
inflation rate of month (j-1) as the expected inflation rate for month j; thus, I assume 
inflation expectations are adaptive.  
Because the inflation rate is released on a specific day every month, I take the 
commodity and foreign-exchange prices on that specific day and the prior day of each 
month over the period 1982 to 2005, and then calculate first differences. For each asset 
type and for Canada, there are 120 observations for the pre-IT period and 119 
observations for the post-IT period. I omitted one observation on 2/22/2005 because the 
closing price was not available. In Table 2, I present summary statistics for the dependent 
variable—Canadian Commodities and exchange rate. The average refers to the average of 
the percentage change of commodity and foreign exchange prices, and a negative 
minimum value is a log value of a number less than one which means the opening price 
on the inflation release day is lower than the closing price on the prior day. Here the 
approximate equation aa ≈+ )1ln(  is applied, and a  represents the percentage change. 
The same is applied to values reported in Table 4. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Canadian Commodities and exchange rate 
Commodity Period average 
standard 
deviation 
maximum minimum 
Wheat 
1982-1991 0.014 0.717 3.312 -1.792 
1996-2005 -0.05 0.753 2.658 -2.301 
Canola oil 
1982-1991 -0.065 1.1 4.492 -9.042 
1996-2005 0.048 0.73 2.413 -2.744 
Canadian/US Dollar 
Exchange Rate 
1982-1991 -0.028 0.233 0.655 -0.988 
1996-2005 0.081 0.447 1.385 -1.124 
Note: 119 observations for 1982-1991; 120 observations for 1996-2005 
100*}100*)]ln()[ln(100*)]ln(){[ln( 1,11,,1, −−−− −−−=∆ jtjtjtjtt CPICPICPICPIpi
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          In Table 3, I report how commodity and foreign currency prices respond to 
inflation shocks over the two periods for Canada. 
Table 3: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign 
Exchange Prices, Canada 
Commodity Period Coefficient t-statistic P-value R-squared 
Wheat 
1982-1991 
-0.001 -0.74 0.459 0.005 
(0.002) 
   
1996-2005 
-0.005    -1.85** 0.068 0.028 
(0.003)       
Canola oil 
1982-1991 
0.001 0.19 0.849 0.000 
(0.003) 
   
1996-2005 
-0.004    -1.61*** 0.109 0.022 
(0.003)       
Canadian/US 
Dollar 
Exchange 
Rate 
1982-1991 
0.000 0.58 0.564 0.003 
(0.001) 
   
1996-2005 
-0.004  -2.18* 0.031 0.039 
(0.002)       
Notes: * indicates significance of coefficient at the 5% level 
           **indicates significance of coefficient at the 10% level 
           (Standard errors are given in parentheses) 
I also compute standard errors and the t-and P-values using the robust regression 
method (i.e., regression with robust standard errors), and the results are almost 
identical. This also applies to other regression results reported in this thesis.   
 
The results in Table 3 indicate that, in the post-IT period, commodity prices 
respond negatively and significantly to inflation shocks at the 10% and 11% level for 
wheat and canola oil, respectively. In addition, the Canadian/US dollar exchange rate is 
also significantly affected by inflation shocks at the 5% level in the post-IT period. In 
comparison, there is no significant response in the pre-IT period, regardless of the sign of 
the coefficients. This result, together with the observed (and theoretically substantiated) 
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negative relationship between real commodity prices and real interest rates, provides 
strong evidence that inflation shocks affected commodity and foreign-exchange prices 
during the post-IT period primarily through the channel of the real interest rates instead 
of the channel of expected inflation rates. In particular, in the post-IT period, market 
participants perceived an inflation shock as a one-time event the central bank would 
reverse, so they raised their expectations of the real interest rates and, consequently, 
commodity and foreign-exchange prices fell below their long-run equilibriums until the 
expected rise of each offset the higher expected real interest rate. The different response 
of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks in the pre- and post-IT 
periods indicates that expected inflation is well anchored in post-IT period, and I reason 
this is because of the inflation-targeting framework. This in turn indicates that the 
inflation-targeting framework is effective and the Bank of Canada gained credibility by 
adopting it.  
In order to compare the U.S. monetary policy effects with Canada, I test the 
responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices over the same time periods for the 
U.S.: the pre-IT period from 1982 to 1991 and the post-IT period from 1996 to 2005. The 
U.S. monetary experience offers a rich comparison in this case, because although the U.S. 
settled on an implicit inflation-targeting framework by the late 1990s (Goodfiriend, 
2005), it did not explicitly announce its adoption of an inflation-targeting framework. 
Therefore, if an explicit inflation-targeting framework is uniquely effective, the Bank of 
Canada should be more credible than the Federal Reserve in terms of safeguarding its 
inflation target. 
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In Table 4, I present summary statistics for the dependent variable—the U.S. 
Commodities and exchange rates. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for US commodities and exchange rates  
              (120 observations for each period) 
Commodity Period average 
standard 
deviation 
maximum minimum 
Corn 
1982-1991 -0.032 2.619 5.754 -21.380 
1996-2005 0.201 1.277 6.236 -3.624 
Oats 
1982-1991 0.139 2.139 6.175 -14.123 
1996-2005 -0.167 3.098 6.236 -28.414 
Soybeans 
1982-1991 0.127 1.426 4.395 -8.173 
1996-2005 -0.061 0.914 3.250 -5.645 
Soybean Meal 
1982-1991 0.162 1.461 5.436 -6.723 
1996-2005 -0.167 0.857 3.170 -3.950 
Soybean Oil 
1982-1991 0.200 1.232 4.809 -5.293 
1996-2005 0.101 0.759 4.619 -2.382 
Wheat(on CBOT) 
1982-1991 -0.062 3.254 6.436 -32.757 
1996-2005 0.118 1.078 5.573 -1.739 
Wheat(on 
MGEX) 
1982-1991 -0.061 1.605 2.772 -14.944 
1996-2005 -0.067 1.225 5.080 -7.271 
US/Canada 
exchange rate 
1982-1991 0.012 0.241 0.804 -0.863 
1996-2005 0.005 0.415 1.258 -1.433 
Trade Weighted 
exchange rate 
1982-1991 -0.079 0.449 1.141 -1.463 
1996-2005 0.000 0.414 1.233 -1.021 
 
In Tables 5 and 6, I report responses of U.S. commodity and foreign-exchange 
prices over the periods of pre-IT and post-IT, respectively. Corresponding to the U.S. 
inflation release dates, I calculate 120 observations for each commodity (14 commodities 
in total) and foreign-exchange prices in the pre- and post-IT periods. As shown in Table 
5, in the pre-IT period, the sign of the coefficients between the commodity and foreign-
exchange prices and inflation shocks are mixed and there are no significant relationships.  
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Table 5: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange Prices 
over the period 1982-1991, the U.S. 
Commodity Coefficient t-statistic P-value R-squared 
Corn/No.2 Yellow -0.003 (0.010) -0.32 0.753 0.001 
Corn(Pit Only6) -0.003 (0.010) -0.32 0.753 0.001 
Oats/White Heavy 0.005 (0.008) 0.58 0.563 0.003 
Oats(Pit Only) 0.005 (0.008) 0.58 0.563 0.003 
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow -0.001 (0.005) -0.20 0.842 0.000 
Soybeans(Pit Only) -0.001 (0.005) -0.20 0.842 0.000 
Soybean Meal/48% Protein 0.001 (0.005) 0.10 0.919 0.000 
Soybean Meal(Pit Only) 0.001 (0.005) 0.10 0.919 0.000 
Soybean Oil/Crude 0.001 (0.004) 0.18 0.854 0.000 
Soybean Oil(Pit Only) -0.002 (0.004) -0.36 0.722 0.001 
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red -0.006 (0.012) -0.53 0.594 0.002 
Wheat(Pit Only) -0.006 (0.012) -0.53 0.594 0.002 
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein -0.006 (0.006) -0.97 0.333 0.008 
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only) -0.006 (0.006) -0.97 0.333 0.008 
US/Canada exchange rate 0.000 (0.001) -0.33 0.745 0.001 
Trade Weighted exchange rate 0.001 (0.002) 0.33 0.746 0.001 
 Note: Each commodity has 120 observations 
          (Standard errors are given in parentheses)          
 
          In Table 6, I report regression results for the post-IT period. Similar to the pre-IT 
period, the responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks are 
mixed (with both negative and positive coefficients). However, there are indeed a few (three 
out of sixteen) commodities and exchange rates for which the coefficients are negative and 
significant. For example, in the case of Soybean Meal (Pit Only), the coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level, and a one-percentage increase in the inflation rate causes a 1.8% 
decline in Soybean meal prices. In addition, the response of US/Canada exchange price is 
also significant and negative at the 5% level, i.e., a one-percentage increase in the inflation 
                                                 
6Pit only refers to the trading that occurs at a specific venue where buyers and sellers 
communicate using open outcry method to communicate with each other, different from 
what occurs in an electronic trading platform. 
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rate causes a 0.7% decline in US/Canada exchange price. Those significantly negative 
coefficients appear to be consistent with the effect of the inflation-targeting framework. This 
could be explained by the change in monetary regimes from a dual mandate to maintain both 
high employment and low and stable inflation to an implicit inflation-targeting framework 
from the pre-period to the post-IT period.  
Table 6: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange Prices 
over the period 1996-2005, the U.S. 
Commodity Coefficient t-statistic P-value R-squared 
Corn/No.2 Yellow 0.016 (0.009)    1.76** 0.081 0.026 
Corn(Pit Only) 0.005 (0.010) 0.47 0.639 0.002 
Oats/White Heavy -0.006 (0.025) -0.23 0.817 0.001 
Oats(Pit Only) -0.017 (0.025) -0.68 0.500 0.004 
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow 0.007 (0.005) 1.34 0.183 0.015 
Soybeans(Pit Only) -0.008 (0.007) -1.07 0.288 0.010 
Soybean Meal/48% Protein -0.009 (0.005)   -1.65** 0.101 0.023 
Soybean Meal(Pit Only) -0.018 (0.007)  -2.78* 0.006 0.061 
Soybean Oil/Crude 0.004 (0.005) 0.72 0.471 0.004 
Soybean Oil(Pit Only) 0.001 (0.006) 0.17 0.862 0.000 
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red 0.012 (0.008) 1.54 0.126 0.020 
Wheat(Pit Only) 0.009 (0.009) 1.10 0.272 0.010 
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein 0.014 (0.009) 1.56 0.122 0.020 
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only) 0.012 (0.010) 1.24 0.217 0.013 
US/Canada exchange rate -0.007 (0.003)  -2.05* 0.043 0.034 
Trade Weighted exchange rate -0.001 (0.003) -0.24 0.808 0.001 
Notes: * indicates significance of coefficient at the 5% level 
           ** indicates significance of coefficient at the 10% level 
           Each commodity has 120 observations 
           (Standard errors are given in parentheses) 
 
The pre-IT period of the US falls into the period when Paul Volcker was the 
chairman of the Fed, and when the Fed had a credibility problem, which showed up as 
“inflation scares”—sharply rising long-term bond rates reflecting long-term inflation 
49 
 
 
expectations. Although the Volcker Fed had made some preemptive actions against 
inflation, another “inflation scare” occurred in 1987 when stock market crashed near the 
end of Volcker's term as the chairman of the Fed. In summer of 1987, Greenspan became 
the Chairman of the Fed in place of Volcker. To overcome the 1987 stock market crash, 
the Greenspan Fed took a series of policy actions to reverse the loss of Fed’s credibility 
for low and stable inflation. In practice, the Greenspan Fed’s preemptive actions again 
inflation can be viewed as the emergence of an implicit inflation-targeting policy regime. 
Particularly, owing to the 1994 preemptive interest rate policy actions, inflation and 
inflation expectations were anchored more firmly than ever before, and by 1996 the bond 
rate was down to around 6 percent which was viewed as “the death of inflation” 
(Goodfiriend, 2005).  The change of the Fed’s credibility for low and stable inflation and 
inflation expectations from the Volcker to Greenspan era may at least in part explain the 
statistically significant and negative results that I obtained in the post-IT period.  
Overall, there is no apparent difference between the response of the commodity 
and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks in the pre- and post-IT periods for the 
US, and thus there is less compelling evidence of a change (toward credibility) in the 
markets’ perception about U.S. monetary policy.  However, for the US, the switch of 
responses in Soybean Meal and US/Canada exchange prices from insignificant in the pre-
IT period to significantly negative in the post-IT period is consistent with the fact that the 
Greenspan Fed gained credibility for low and stable inflation and, thus, low and stable 
inflation expectations, thanks to the implicit inflation-targeting framework adopted by the 
Greenspan Fed.  
 
50 
 
 
4.2 Robustness tests of the model  
To check the robustness of my methodology, I apply it to the U.S. experience 
during the periods of November 3, 1978-October 4, 1979 and July 7, 1980-November 5, 
1982, which Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) have examined. Between these two periods, 
there was a monetary regime shift: the Fed (under the leadership of Paul Volcker) 
announced a change in operating procedures on October 6, 1979 and imposed credit 
controls from March to July 1980 in order to get the money growth rate under control. 
The U.S. experienced a sharp increase in the level and volatility of inflation and inflation 
expectation during 1970s, which resulted in a near total collapse of the Fed’s credibility 
for low inflation. In 1979 when Volcker became the chairman of the Fed, the Volcker 
Fed endeavored to get the inflation down and restore the Fed’s credibility for low 
inflation. At that time, the Volcker Fed realized that it is difficult to disinflate if the fed 
continued to make monetary policy by pursuing interest rate policy (target the federal 
funds rate). Because if the Fed chose to increase the real interest rate to stabilize the 
economy by raising the nominal interest rate, its efforts would need to be understood and 
trusted by the public. However, having experienced the collapse of credibility, the public 
could underestimate the Fed’s determination to bring down inflation. Hence, it was 
difficult for the Fed to judge how a given nominal interest rate policy action would 
translate into an adjustment of the real interest rate. Therefore, on October 6, 1979, under 
Chairman Paul Volcker, the FOMC changed its monetary policy approach to target 
money growth rates, which would allow interest rates to rise substantially and, thus, lean 
against inflation pressures (Goodfiriend, 2005). Figure 5 shows inflation and nominal 
interest rates around the period of the Volcker Fed, in which the Fed experienced a 
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change in monetary operating procedure. From the picture, after July 1980 inflation starts 
to decrease and, the trend of nominal interest rates is opposite to the trend of inflation. 
The opposite trends reflect anchored inflation after 1980, which may be explained by the 
change of monetary operating procedure. 
Figure 5: Inflation and Nominal Interest Rates in the U.S., 1975-1985 
Source: OECD main economic indicators 
Given these new operating procedures and the Great Inflation that preceded them, 
I hypothesize that in the pre-October 1979 period, commodities and foreign-exchange 
prices were not responding negatively to positive inflation shocks.  In contrast, I 
hypothesize that in the post-July 1980 period, these prices did respond negatively to 
inflation shocks, because the market believed in the Fed’s (credible) commitment to 
achieve its preannounced money growth targets and, thus, disinflate. Indeed, the result of 
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) show that some (though not nearly all) responses of 
commodities and foreign-exchange prices to money surprises—their measure of 
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announcements of inflation—changed from no significant relationship to negatively 
significant from the pre-October 1979  to the post-July 1980 period. 
Using my approach, I find a similar switch of responses to inflation shocks (as I 
measure them) of commodities and foreign-exchange prices, as shown in Tables 7 and 8. 
In particular, in the pre-October 1979 period, the responses reveal no clear sign pattern, 
whereas in the post-July 1980 period, the responses are negative except for two wheat 
series exchanged in MGEX (Wheat/Spring 14% Protein and Wheat, Spring (Pit Only)) 
and the Trade weighted exchange rate that positively reacts to inflation shocks. It is 
interesting to note that the response of US/Canada exchange prices switch from an 
insignificant positive coefficient of 0.004 to a significant negative coefficient of -0.001. 
This result is similar to Frankel’s result of for the Canadian dollar, for which the response 
switches from an insignificantly negative coefficient of -0.011 to a significantly negative 
coefficient of -0.077. Although Frankel’s results in post-July 1980 period are all negative, 
only a few cases (gold, cattle, the Swiss franc and Canadian dollar) are statistically 
significant at 5% level. The general consistency between my test results and that of 
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) for the same period suggests that my method used to test 
the credibility of central bank is meaningful.   
Table 7: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange 
Prices over the period 11/3/1978-10/4/1979, the U.S. 
Commodity Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
R-
squared 
Corn/No.2 Yellow 0.001 (0.005) 0.14 0.893 0.002 
Corn(Pit Only) 0.001 (0.005) 0.14 0.893 0.002 
Oats/White Heavy -0.013 (0.008) -1.54 0.158 0.209 
Oats(Pit Only) -0.013 (0.008) -1.54 0.158 0.209 
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow 0.001 (0.003) 0.24 0.815 0.006 
Soybeans(Pit Only) 0.001 (0.003) 0.24 0.815 0.006 
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Soybean Meal/48% Protein 0.000 (0.003) 0.03 0.975 0.000 
Soybean Meal(Pit Only) 0.000 (0.003) 0.03 0.975 0.000 
Soybean Oil/Crude 0.000 (0.007) 0.02 0.981 0.000 
Soybean Oil(Pit Only) 0.000 (0.007) 0.02 0.981 0.000 
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red -0.010 (0.005) -2.06 0.070 0.320 
Wheat(Pit Only) -0.010 (0.005) -2.06 0.070 0.320 
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein -0.004 (0.003) -1.54 0.158 0.208 
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only) -0.004 (0.003) -1.54 0.158 0.208 
US/Canada exchange rate 0.004 (0.003) 1.28 0.233 0.154 
Trade Weighted exchange 
rate 
-0.002 (0.003) -0.76 0.469 0.060 
 Note: Each commodity has 11 observations 
          (Standard errors are given in parentheses) 
 
Table 8: Estimated Effects of Inflation Shocks on Commodity and Foreign Exchange 
Prices over the period 7/7/1980-11/5/1982, the U.S. 
Commodity Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
R-
squared 
Corn/No.2 Yellow -0.004 (0.005) -0.76 0.456 0.022 
Corn(Pit Only) -0.004 (0.005) -0.76 0.456 0.022 
Oats/White Heavy -0.001 (0.008) -0.14 0.892 0.001 
Oats(Pit Only) -0.001 (0.008) -0.14 0.892 0.001 
Soybeans/No.1 Yellow -0.001 (0.003) -0.39 0.703 0.006 
Soybeans(Pit Only) -0.001 (0.003) -0.39 0.703 0.006 
Soybean Meal/48% Protein -0.003 (0.002) -1.11 0.279 0.045 
Soybean Meal(Pit Only) -0.003 (0.002) -1.11 0.279 0.045 
Soybean Oil/Crude -0.002 (0.003) -0.90 0.375 0.030 
Soybean Oil(Pit Only) -0.002 (0.003) -0.90 0.375 0.030 
Wheat/No.2 Soft Red -0.001 (0.004) -0.22 0.826 0.002 
Wheat(Pit Only) -0.001 (0.004) -0.22 0.826 0.002 
Wheat/Spring 14% Protein 0.001 (0.002) 0.47 0.645 0.008 
Wheat, Spring(Pit Only) 0.001 (0.002) 0.44 0.661 0.008 
US/Canada exchange rate -0.001 (0.001)  -1.78** 0.086 0.109 
Trade Weighted exchange rate 0.003 (0.001)  2.34* 0.027 0.174 
 Note: * indicates significance of coefficient at the 5% level 
           ** indicates significance of coefficient at the 10% level 
           Each commodity has 28 observations 
          (Standard errors are given in parentheses) 
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In summary, I examine the responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices 
to inflation shocks in the period of 1982 to 2005 for Canada and the U.S. For Canada, the 
responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks changed from 
effectively zero to negative from the period of 1982 to 1991 to 1996 to 2005, consistent 
with the expected result of the adoption of an inflation-targeting framework by the Bank 
of Canada in 1991. By adopting the framework, the Bank of Canada could better and 
more credibly maintain low and stable inflation. In comparison, the response of 
commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks shows no clear sign pattern 
and, has only changed in a few cases from the period of 1982 to 1991 to 1996 to 2005 for 
the U.S. This change is not as strong as Canada. This is not a surprise, because the U.S. 
did not explicitly adopt the inflation-targeting framework. However, the changes in the 
cases of Soybean Meal and US/Canada exchange prices I study suggest that the Fed has 
earned some credibility for low inflation due to its adoption of an implicit inflation-target 
framework during 1996 to 2005. The comparison between the two sub-periods for 
Canada, as well as that between Canada and the U.S., provides strong evidence that the 
inflation-targeting framework is effective and, the central bank that explicitly adopts it 
should be more credible than the one does not. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
In the early 1990s, the Bank of Canada explicitly adopted an inflation-targeting 
framework for monetary policy, while the Federal Reserve did not.  Instead, the Federal 
Reserve seemed to settle on an implicit inflation-targeting framework, at least until the 
late 1990s. In this study, I test whether the Bank of Canada achieved credibility for low 
and stable inflation because it adopted an explicit inflation-targeting framework and, 
likewise, whether the Federal Reserve achieved credibility for low and stable inflation 
because it adopted an implicit inflation-targeting framework.  
To measure central bank credibility, I estimate how commodity and foreign-
exchange prices respond in Canada and the United States to announcements of inflation 
shocks over the period of 1982 to 2005. Additionally, to gain insight into how monetary 
policy is perceived over time, I divide the sample period into two distinct sub-periods 
representing different monetary policy regimes: 1982 to 1991 represents the pre-IT policy 
regime and 1996 to 2005 represents the post-IT policy regime—explicit or otherwise.  
The responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to inflation shocks 
reflect whether the market’s inflation expectations are anchored, which in turn reflects 
central bank credibility for low and stable inflation. Specifically, commodity and foreign-
exchange prices fall in response to a positive inflation shock if the market interprets the 
shock as a one-off event the central bank will reverse. This is because the market reasons 
that the central bank is credibly committed to its inflation target; thus, the market expects 
the central bank to raise real interest rates to get the inflation rate back on target.  In this 
case, expected inflation is unchanged. The higher expected real interest rates make the 
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cost of storing commodities and foreign currencies higher and, thus, investors shift out of 
commodities and foreign currencies and into money; this shift drives down commodity 
and foreign-exchange prices. In contrast, commodity and foreign-exchange prices rise in 
response to a positive inflation shock if the market interprets the shock as a new, looser 
monetary policy stance. Because the central bank does not demonstrate credibility, the 
market adjusts its expectations of inflation upward in face of inflation shocks; the 
expected real interest rate is unchanged. The higher expectations of inflation induce 
investors to shift into commodities and foreign currencies and out of interest earning 
financial assets and, thus drive up commodity and foreign-exchange prices. In summary, 
commodity and foreign-exchange prices negatively respond to inflation shocks if the 
central bank is credible, because in this case the expected real interest rate rises while 
expected inflation is anchored. Whereas, commodity and foreign-exchange prices 
positively respond to inflation shocks if the central bank is not credible, because in this 
case the expected real interest rate is unchanged and expected inflation is revised upward.  
My results indicate that, for Canada, there is no significant response of 
commodity and foreign-exchange prices to the announcements of inflation shocks in the 
pre-IT period, regardless of the sign of the coefficients. In comparison, all the commodity 
and foreign-exchange prices respond negatively and significantly to the announcements 
of inflation shocks in the post-IT period. That is, in the post-IT period, market 
participants perceived an inflation shock as a one-time event the central bank would 
reverse, so they raised their expectations of real interest rates without changing their 
expectations of inflation and, consequently, commodity and foreign-exchange prices fell 
according to the observed negative relationship between real commodity prices and real 
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interest rates. The different responses of commodity and foreign-exchange prices to 
inflation shocks in the pre- and post-IT periods indicate that expected inflation is well 
anchored in the post-IT period but not in the pre-IT period. The anchored expected 
inflation reflects that the Bank of Canada achieved credibility since its adoption of 
inflation-targeting. So I conclude that Canada’s inflation-targeting framework amounts to 
a credible commitment to low and stable inflation.  
For the US, in the pre-IT period, the sign of the coefficients between the 
commodity and foreign-exchange prices and the inflation shocks are mixed (with both 
negative and positive coefficients) and there are no statistically significant relationships. 
Similar to the pre-IT period, in the post-IT period, the responses of commodity and 
foreign-exchange prices to the announcements of inflation shocks are still mixed and, 
have only changed in a few cases from the sub-period of pre-IT to post-IT and the change 
is not as strong as Canada. This is not a surprise because the U.S. did not explicitly adopt 
an inflation-targeting framework. However, in the post-IT period, there are indeed a few 
(three out of sixteen) commodities and foreign-exchange prices for which the coefficients 
are negative and significant. Those significantly negative coefficients appear to be 
consistent with the effect of the Fed’s implicit inflation-targeting framework. The switch 
of responses from insignificant to significantly negative could be explained by the change 
of the Fed’s monetary regime from a dual mandate to maintain both high employment 
and low and stable inflation to an implicit inflation-targeting framework from the pre-
period to the post-IT period.  
Overall, the results of this study support my working hypothesis that by adopting 
an inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy, the Bank of Canada achieved a 
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relatively high degree of credibility in terms of maintaining low and stable inflation both 
relative to its past and relative to the Federal Reserve, which did not explicitly adopt an 
inflation-targeting framework (during my sample period).  The comparison between the 
two sub-periods for Canada, as well as that between Canada and the U.S. provides strong 
evidence that the inflation-targeting framework is effective and, the central bank that 
explicitly adopts as a monetary policy framework should be more credible than the one 
does not. 
In addition, I test the robustness of  my model by applying the same method to the 
U.S. during the periods of November 3, 1978 to October 4, 1979 and July 7,1980 to 
November 5, 1982 that Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) examined. Between these two 
periods, there was a monetary regime shift: the FOMC (under the leadership of Paul 
Volcker) changed its monetary policy approach from targeting the federal funds rate to 
targeting the money growth rate, which was then thought to be a better approach to 
controlling inflation. Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) find that the responses of 
commodities and foreign-exchange prices to money surprises—their measure of 
announcements of inflation—changed from no significant relationship to negatively 
significant from the pre-October 1979  to the post-July 1980 period. Using my approach, 
I find a similar switch of responses to inflation shocks (as I measure them) of 
commodities and foreign-exchange prices. The general consistency between my test 
result and that of Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) for the same period suggests that my 
method used to test the central bank credibility is effective.   
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Appendix I: Derivation of α  
Equation 25 is derived as follows. 
])1([ 22 yEL ααpi −+=                                                )21(  
ttt r ελpi +−=                                                        )22(  
 )
1
( ttt ry εω
+−=                                                     )23(  
tt zr ε=                                                              )24(  
Substituting Equation 24 into Equations 22 and 23 and taking the variances of inflation 
and output yields Equation 30 and 31. 
                                                         
222 )1( εpi σλσ z−=                                                     (30) 
                                                         
222 )
1
( εσω
σ += zy                                                     (31) 
Substituting these expressions into Equation 21 yields Equation 32. 
                                         ])
1
)[(1(])1[( 2222 εε σω
ασλα +−+−= zzL                                (32) 
Minimizing Equation 32 with respect to z  yields 
)1(
1
)1(
2 ααλ
ω
ααλ
−+
−−
=z . 
Finally, substituting the expression for z  into Equations 30 and 31 yields Equation 25. 
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Appendix II: Data Specification 
Country Variables Frequency Source Sample Size 
Canada 
Long-term interest rates monthly OECD - MEI 
1/1971-
12/2007 
Core CPI inflation1 monthly OECD - MEI 
1/1971-
12/2007 
Commodity price index monthly Bank of Canada 
1/1972-
12/2007 
CPI release dates monthly Statistics Canada 
1/1982-
12/2005 
Commodity futures 
price 
daily 
CRB InfoTech CD - 
Futures 
1/1982-
12/2005 
Canada / U.S. Foreign 
Exchange Rate2 
daily 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
1/1982-
12/2005 
US 
Long-term interest rates monthly OECD - MEI 
1/1971-
12/2007 
Core CPI inflation monthly OECD - MEI 
1/1971-
12/2007 
Producer price index monthly 
U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
1/1972-
12/2007 
CPI release dates monthly 
U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
1/1982-
12/2005 
Commodity futures 
price 
daily 
CRB InfoTech CD - 
Futures 
1/1982-
12/2005 
Trade Weighted U.S. 
Dollar Index: Major 
Currencies3 
daily 
Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 
1/1982-
12/2005 
 
1 Consumer prices - Annual inflation, all items non-food non-energy 
2 Canadian Dollars to One U.S. Dollar, Noon buying rates in New York City for cable 
transfers payable in foreign currencies. 
3 A weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against a subset of 
the broad index currencies that circulate widely outside the country of issue. Major 
currencies index includes the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Australia, and Sweden.  
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Appendix III: Commodity Futures Characteristics 
Symbol Commodity Exchange1 Trading Hours (E.S.T.)2 
WC Canola / No. 1 WCE 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
WW Wheat, Domestic Feed/No. 3 WCE 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
C- Corn / No. 2 Yellow CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
2C Corn (Pit Only) CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
O- Oats / White Heavy CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
2O Oats (Pit Only) CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
S- Soybeans / No. 1 Yellow CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
2S Soybeans (Pit Only) CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
SM Soybean Meal / 48% Protein CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
2L Soybean Meal (Pit Only) CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
BO Soybean Oil / Crude CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
2B Soybean Oil (Pit Only) CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
W- Wheat / No. 2 Soft Red CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
2W Wheat (Pit Only) CBOT/CMEGROUP 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
MW Wheat / Spring 14% Protein MGEX 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
2M Wheat, Spring (Pit Only) MGEX 10:30a.m. - 2:15p.m. 
 
1 WCE, Winnipeg Commodity Exchange;  CBOT/CMEGROUP, Chicago Board of 
Trade; MGEX, Minneapolis Grain Exchange. 
 
2 Trading hours quoted are as before 2006. 
 
 
